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Community-based development has been criticized for its inadequate understanding of 
power relationships at the local level, which thus leaves room for elite capture. This 
paper compares and contrasts two case studies, both of which take power seriously in 
their institutional designs. The solar home system in Bangladesh, represents the 
‘counter-elite’ approach and explicitly excludes local elites from the decision-making 
process. The trans-boundary water governance project in Ghana, in contrast, adopts the 
‘co-opt-elite’ approach and deliberately absorbs local elites into the water committee. 
This paper suggests that, while the ‘counter-elite’ approach is not necessarily effective 
in challenging elite domination, because of the structural asset dependence of poor 
people on the elites, the ‘co-opt-elite’ approach risks legitimizing the authority of the 
elites and worsening poverty by implementing ‘anti-poor’ policies. This paper 
concludes that the success of dealing with elite capture lies in the flexible use of the 
‘counter-elite’ and ‘co-opt-elite’ approaches together with the need to secure alternative 
livelihoods and to achieve empowerment with the poor. 
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1 Introduction 
Community-driven development, widely embraced by the World Bank and other 
international development agencies since the 1990s, is an attempt to return decision-
making power to local people. By promoting decentralization and participation, the 
community-based projects are intended to achieve good governance at the grassroots 
level. Greater transparency and public election of leaders are expected to reduce 
corruption; a sense of ownership is expected to create fairer representation in 
committees across gender, age and generation; and free-riding behaviour is minimized 
by stricter rule enforcement and use of sanctions (Gibson et al. 2006; Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2000). These ‘good governance’ principles and policies should ensure that 
the benefits of development ‘flow to the community as a whole and more specifically to 
the poor’ (Fritzen 2007: 1359).  
Many of these projects have not, however, worked as intended. Some scholars have 
posed tough questions about the decentralized, community-based approach for ‘not 
necessarily empowering in practice’ (Mansuri and Rao 2004: 57). They challenge its 
effectiveness in targeting the poor. They also voice their concerns about the 
vulnerability of the projects to elite capture. Contrary to the assumptions that elite 
capture can be avoided by democraticizing the decision-making process, Platteau (2004: 
225) argues that the newly-created participatory space fails to ‘mitigate the opportunism 
of local leaders’, and instead, gives the elites incentives to intervene.  
Some neo-institutional thinkers blame the failure of the community-driven projects for 
poor institutional design, explaining that ‘weak institutional control mechanisms create 
opportunities for local elites to siphon off substantial shares of the benefits’ of local 
resources (Iversen et al. 2006: 93). The solution, they propose, is institutional 
strengthening in order to remove the ‘incentives for rent seeking’ and to secure ‘a more 
equitable distribution of benefits’ (p. 106).  
This institutional analysis has, however, been criticized for failing to understand the 
nature of elite capture. Some scholars argue that the problems lie in an over-simplistic 
approach to institutions and an inadequate understanding of power relations (Masaki 
2007; Mehta et al. 1999). First, the faith in institutional crafting to achieve desirable 
outcomes of collective action is problematic. The instrumental use of institutions and 
the simplistic assumption of the linear evolution of institutions are inadequate in 
understanding the complexity and the unintended consequences of institutional crafting 
(Cleaver 2002). For instance, D’Exelle and Ridle (2008) suggest that setting up new 
formal institutions at the local level, such as sanctions and democratic decision-making 
by voting, are not effective in challenging indigenous leadership because villagers are 
‘reluctant to make use of the punishment mechanism’ (p. 1) and consensus-seeking 
‘makes it practically impossible for individual community agents to oppose the elite’ 
(p. 3). 
Another limitation of the institutional thinking lies in an inadequate understanding of 
power relations. Fritzen (2007) warns that many community-based projects are only 
successful in changing the institutional forms, but not power relations. The problems, 
Sneddon and Fox (2007) argue, lie in ‘relative power of different actors’ in community 
dynamics (p. 1360). Local elites are capable of mobilizing, accumulating and investing 
in their already-owned social, political and economic capital to hijack the projects   2
(Platteau and Gaspart 2003). In contrast, poor people who contribute their time, 
resource and labour do not gain much out of the projects, and the sense of 
disillusionment discourages them from further participation (Marcus and Asmorowati 
2006).  
The literature offers two approaches to deal with the issues of elite capture: counter and 
co-opt-elite. The ‘counter-elite’ approach advocates challenging elites by completely 
excluding them in the institutional design. It assumes that all elites are bad in nature. By 
raising public awareness of power inequalities and building local capacity, this approach 
suggests that community empowerment and political citizenship would be effective in 
resisting elite domination (Hickey and Mohan 2004; Mohan and Stokke 2000).  
The ‘co-opt-elite’ approach, in contrast, suggests that cooperation with elites, rather 
than confrontation, is the solution to alleviating poverty. It asserts that not all elites are 
bad, and some of them can play a constructive role in community development. It also 
assumes that power is not a ‘zero-sum’ game and a pragmatic use of elites’ networks 
and resources channels benefits to poor communities. The notion of the ‘benevolent 
elite’ by Platteau and Abraham (2002) fits into this school of thought.  
The objective of this paper is to examine whether these two approaches are effective in 
challenging elite capture and maximizing benefits to the poor. It will draw on two 
community-based projects as case studies. The first case study is a communal solar 
home system project in Bangladesh. It is influenced by the ‘counter-elite’ approach by 
explicitly excluding local elites, known as sardars, from the new governance structures 
of managing the solar lighting facilities. Another case study is a trans-boundary water 
governance project in Ghana. Local chieftains and tindana (religious leaders) were co-
opted in the water committee in order to bring tangible benefits to local poor people.  
By comparing and contrasting these two case studies, this paper will demonstrate the 
paradoxes of including and excluding local elites in the decision-making process. It will 
argue that the ‘counter-elite’ approach is not necessarily effective in eroding the elites’ 
power whereas the ‘co-opt-elite’ approach can worsen poverty at local level. It will 
show that sardars in Bangladesh felt threatened by their exclusion from the solar 
system, which led them to jeopardize the micro-credit system in revenge. Local people 
bowed to the pressure and consequently invited them to the committee as ‘advisers’. 
This paper will also suggest that the asset dependence of the poor on the elites forces the 
poor to exercise agency that help reinforce the authority of the elites. This paper will 
also draw on the experience of the water committee in Ghana to demonstrate how 
political absorption of the local elites risks legitimizing their leadership. It will suggest 
that the lack of poverty sensitivity amongst the elites helped implement water-related 
policies that could worsen poverty at the local level. Therefore, this paper suggests a set 
of policies to deal with the paradox of inclusion and exclusion of elites in development 
projects. It stresses the importance of breaking the patron-client dependence by securing 
alternative livelihoods for the poor. The role of NGOs becomes more crucial at the post-
implementation stage of the projects in order to scrutinize and respond to elite control 
over the development processes. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. It first conceptualizes elite capture and power 
and then discusses the ‘counter-elite’ and ‘co-opt-elite’ approaches. It then elaborates 
the two case studies in Bangladesh and Ghana respectively and explores the complex 
consequences of excluding and including local elites in the institutional designs. It   3
concludes by suggesting a number of principles that may help address the elite capture 
problems.  
2  Conceptualizing power and elite capture  
Elite capture and power are two inter-related and contesting concepts. Being asked what 
she meant by ‘elite’ in an interview, Sarah Palin, the former US Republican vice-
presidential candidate, replied: elites are ‘people who think they’re better than anyone 
else’ (NBC Nightly News, 23 October 2008). Her definition highlights the subjective 
dimension of elite capture and suggests how elites command ‘moral superiority’ (a term 
used by Mosca quoted in Higley and Burton 2006) to make their claims. However, her 
definition is not complete because elites are dependent on non-elites. In Fumanti’s 
word, elites come to power ‘through publicly recognised merit, inheritance, or even 
force’ (Fumanti 2004: 2, my emphasis).  
According to Beard and Phakphian (2009), elites are: ‘individuals who can exert 
disproportionate influence over a collective action process’ (p. 11, my emphasis). Elite 
capture is a situation where elites manipulate the decision-making arena and agenda and 
obtain most of the benefits. In explaining elite domination, Platteau (2004) suggests four 
factors: disparate access to economic resources, asymmetrical social positions, varying 
levels of knowledge of political protocols, and different education attainment in some 
cases (p. 223). Their power is perpetuated through land holdings, family networks, 
employment status, wealth, political and religious affiliation, personal history and 
personality (Dasgupta and Beard 2007: 234).  
Elites can also be analysed from the temporal and spatial perspectives. Higley and 
Burton (2006) suggest that the influence of elites is not ‘one-off’, but is usually 
‘continuous, regular and substantial'. Their influence is not confined to their own 
communities. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) demonstrate how elites make use of their 
intricate networks to occupy various locations of authority and to ‘scale-up’ their power 
from community to regional and national level. What makes elite capture so powerful is 
that elites exert their influence less often by coercion, and more by moral claims and 
symbolic power (Bourdieu 1996). Lay people often follow their leadership in a less-
than-conscious way (Lewis and Hossain 2008).  
The dynamism of elite domination can be demonstrated by a process of ‘elite continuity, 
transformation and replacement’ (Parry 2005: 2) through which elites cooperate, 
compete and reconcile their differences from time to time. This non-linear development 
makes the solution to elite capture proposed by Platteau and Abraham (2002) plausible. 
They claim that elite control can be minimized by heterogeneous representation of 
elites, and that would be ‘sufficiently diversified for a division of opinions to 
development among them’ (p. 124). The collaboration of elites in power sharing, 
however, reduces the effectiveness of the divide-rule.  
2.1  Four dimensions of power  
The complexity of elite capture requires a more critical analysis of power. This paper 
draws on Rowlands’ multi-dimensionality of power. Combining Foucaultian and 
feminist perspectives on power, she suggests four inter-dependent dimensions of power: 
power-over, power-with, power-from-within, and power-to. ‘Power-over’ is coercive   4
force that forces one to do things against their will. ‘Power-with’ emphasizes the 
collective forces, where people cooperate with each other to achieve some outcomes. 
‘Power-from-within’ touches on the psychological power in the minds of people. In 
Shields’ words, this dimension of power is effective in overcoming internalised 
oppression and it focuses on ‘self-value, self-acceptance and self-knowledge’ (1997: 23, 
in Wong 2003: 310). ‘Power-to’ refers to the capacity of individuals to take action. It is 
actually embedded in the three dimensions of power mentioned above. Rowlands 
stresses that these four forms of power are inter-related and context-specific.  
This understanding of power offers a useful analysis to the current two mainstream 
approaches to elite capture; they are: ‘counter-elite’ and ‘co-opt-elite’ approaches. The 
‘counter-elite’ approach conceptualizes elite capture as exploitative and suppressive in 
nature (Scott 1985), which is necessarily undesirable because it works against 
democratic, participatory and pro-poor values. For example, Lewis and Hossain (2008) 
consider local elites as ‘obstacles to progress with poverty reduction development’ (p. 
33). This approach characterises resistance to elite domination as a ‘zero-sum’ game 
since undermining elite influence will return power to the powerless. The solutions to 
elite capture, it suggests, are first, to exclude elites from participating in the newly-
created or existing institutions and second, to empower poor people to take an active 
role in the decision-making process by raising awareness and capacity building (Abe 
2009). Using Rowland’s analysis of power, the protagonists  of  the  ‘counter-elite’ 
approach stress the interdependence of the two dimensions of power: ‘power-over’ and 
‘power-from-within’. In other words, from this perspective, confronting elite 
domination will only make a difference in poor people’s lives if local people have a 
sense of ownership in the process of power seizure.  
The ‘counter-elite’ approach is, however, criticized for taking a simplistic view of 
power, without acknowledging the diversity of elites and the function of elite 
interference. Mansuri and Rao (2004) argue that not all elites are bad. They make a 
distinction between ‘greedy’ elites (p. 43) and ‘benevolent’ elites (p. 55), and the latter 
show altruism and willingness to share some benefits with poor people. This leads 
Dasgupta and Beard (2007) to highlight the differences between ‘elite capture’ and 
‘elite control’ as the latter implies that ‘the project was controlled by local elites, yet 
resources were targeted to deserving beneficiaries’ (p. 244). Our research on solar 
lanterns in Rajasthan, India shows that elite interference could be considered as a 
barometer to indicate the potential values of the projects. If local elites do not show any 
interest in getting involved, it might imply that the benefits that they could get from the 
projects are so limited that even power-thirsty elites cannot be bothered (Wong 2009a).  
These ideas shape the ‘co-opt-elite’ approach. It suggests that confrontation with the 
elites may not do the poor a favour. Instead, it takes a pragmatic perspective and makes 
use of the networks and know-how of the elites to facilitate the management of the 
projects (Rao and Ibanez 2003). In their experience, Lewis and Hossain (2008) find that 
some of the village elite work with external NGOs to improve village water and 
sanitation out of ‘a sense of public duty’ (p. 35). Instead of confronting the elites, they 
recommend that NGOs exploit the ‘politics of reputation’ (p. 49) that can bring some 
benefits to the poor.  
From the perspective of power, the ‘co-opt-elite’ approach focuses on ‘power-from-
within’. It considers elites as partners, rather than enemies. It accepts that power is not 
evenly-distributed in communities, but working with local elites helps address some of   5
the practical problems that the poor face. This school suggests that the solution to elite 
capture is to absorb the elites into the projects and to let them play an active role in the 
decision-making process. This approach risks repeating the mistakes of the top-down, 
elite-driven approach to development, but Abe (2009) defends it by suggesting that 
including elites in the management can ensure good leadership that builds social capital 
in the community (p. 63).  
2.2 Subjectivity-Institution-Structure  theory   
While the ‘counter-elite’ and ‘co-opt-elite’ approaches highlight different strategies in 
managing elites, we argue that they share a common weakness: an inadequate 
understanding of the interactions between elites and non-elites in the process of 
producing and reproducing power dynamics. In particular, we need to have a deeper 
analysis of how community members, especially poor people, feel and think about their 
local elites, of how social norms and rules help challenge and reinforce the 
subordination of the power relationships, and of how power inequalities are embedded 
in social structures.  
In order to explore such complex relationships, we will draw on the ‘Subjectivity-
Institution-Structure’ theory (Wong and Sharp 2009). Subjectivity is defined as the 
reasoning and perception of human actions. It articulates the conscious and less-
conscious aspects of people’s motivation for participation and exercising their rights in 
their communities. Gough and Scott (2006) argue that the dual nature of subjectivity – 
transformative and reactionary – offers opportunities as well as obstacles in promoting 
citizenship. In the context of elite capture, the concept of subjectivity highlights the 
‘emotional, cognitive and physical’ experiences between elites and non-elites. 
Institutions are rules, norms and conventions which shape people’s daily interactions. 
Douglas (1987) suggests that: ‘social institutions encode information. They are credited 
with making routine decisions, solving routine problems, and doing a lot of regular 
thinking on behalf of individuals’ (p. 47). In the context of elite capture, the concept 
highlights how the relationships between elites and non-elites are mediated by social 
values and precedents, and how that helps legitimize, and question, the power 
domination and subordination. Structures, defined by Layder, are ‘structured patterning 
of social relationships and reproduced practices over time and space … and the power 
relations that underpin them’ (1994: 140). Structures show hierarchies of social control, 
such as class, gender and ethnicity that affect the distribution of resources and power 
between individuals. The concept of structures matters in the study of elite capture 
because it provides the historical and socio-cultural backgrounds that enable and 
constrain individuals to take actions.  
The ‘subjectivity-institution-structure’ theory, I argue, is useful in understanding the 
intertwined relationships between elites and non-elites. It explores how differing 
subjectivities and institutions govern attitudes and behaviour and how they are shaped in 
the context of wider structural issues. In other words, subjectivity and structure are 
linked through institutions and expressed in social practice. This understanding of the 
complex interactions helps contextualize power dynamics in the process of social 
connectivity between elites and non-elites.    6
2.3  Research design and questions 
The two case studies illustrated in this paper come from two separate projects. The 
original designs of these projects were not intended to deal with the issues of elite 
capture. We were requested by a Bangladeshi NGO, Participatory Research and 
Development Initiative, to examine the social impact of a communal solar home project 
in a Hindu fishing community in the Cox’s Bazar district in south Bangladesh. This 
project was sponsored by the British Council and we completed it in August 2007. We 
conducted another study on the impact of a regional trans-boundary water governance 
project in which communities in the north of Ghana and the south of Burkina Faso 
negotiated the use of water with government officials and NGOs. It was conducted in 
August 2008, funded by the British Academy.  
During our investigation, we realized that local elites in both projects played a 
significant role in shaping the process of implementation and outcomes. They exerted 
their influences through direct involvement as well as indirect ties with other 
stakeholders. We therefore changed some of our research questions, asking what 
motivated elites and non-elites for participation in the projects. We wanted to know the 
subjective feelings and experiences of poor people in interacting with the elites in their 
everyday interactions. Regarding the participation process, we explored the 
contributions elites and non-elites had made to the projects in terms of time and 
resources. We examined who made what decisions in the projects and how negotiations 
were made. We also raised questions about the distribution of costs and benefits in the 
outcomes of the projects. 
Both of these projects had conducted participatory appraisal exercises before they 
started. The solar home project in Bangladesh was poverty-specific. The participatory 
exercise identified Sardars, the local elites in the Hindu fishing community, as the main 
cause of the poverty since they owned most of the fishing equipment. In contrast, the 
trans-boundary water governance project in Ghana was more concerned with climate 
change and the long-term ecological stability of the White Volta River Basin. The 
participatory exercise had identified chieftains and Tindana as local elites. Chieftains 
owned most of the land while Tindana were religious leaders who had the authority to 
command resources from their community members.  
After identifying the elites, we wanted to find out who were the poor and the very poor 
in the communities. In the first few days of our site visits, we randomly asked villagers 
what they meant by poverty and who they considered as poor and very poor. Both case 
studies characterized poor people similarly as people with limited savings, limited 
education, no sons in the families, widows with small families to look after, the elderly, 
the ill and the disabled. The very poor were villagers without savings, no education, no 
sons in the families, widows with big families to take care, elderly with poor health, the 
severely ill and the disabled. In the fishing community in Bangladesh, villagers 
considered households without fishing equipment, such as boats and fishing nets, as 
poor. In contrast, community members in Ghana considered the land-less or those 
owning small and marginalized land as poor. We also talked to NGO workers, local 
politicians and government officials in our projects. Apart from formal interviews, we 
also relied on informal conversations, observations and participatory map-drawing 
exercises to capture the interactions of the elites and non-elites in the projects. We kept 
a research diary and notes during interviews and then coded the data according to 
themes and key concepts, such as gender, power and participation, to make our analysis.   7
In the following section, we outline the contexts of the two case studies, focusing on the 
institutional arrangements that worked with, as well as against, local elites.  
3  Case study A: The ‘counter-elite’ approach in a communal solar home system 
in Bangladesh  
This village was one of 37 fishing communities targeted by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the Department of Fisheries in Bangladesh. 
These organizations carried out an ‘Empowerment of Coastal Fishing Community for 
Livelihood Security’ project (Coastal Empowerment Project in short) in 2002-2006 
which aimed to mobilize communities to improve the management of coastal fisheries 
resources and disaster preparedness. The organizations recruited a Dhaka-based NGO to 
run the project and offered micro-credit financing to promote alternative income 
generating activities.  
The NGO conducted a ‘poverty-sensitive’ appraisal exercise before the project started 
and realized that Sardars, known as local money lenders, were responsible for causing 
local poverty because they exploited poor people by charging high interests. Sardars 
were rich and powerful because ‘they have more sons, more manpower, they can get 
more fish …… their sons receive better education, they start to loan money to people’ 
(interview with government official, 17 August 2007).  
In light of this, project leaders considered Sardars as the main obstacle against the 
success of the project. With the goals to reduce poverty and to empower local people, 
democratizing local management by encouraging participation of poor people in new 
institutional arrangements was introduced. Any man and woman above 18 years old 
from each household was encouraged to join the Village Organizations, one for men and 
another for women. The separation of women from men was intended to enable women 
to express themselves without worrying about men’s interference. From each Village 
Organization, seven members were elected to form a Service Committee. One of the 
key roles of the Committee was to manage the micro-credit financing. During the 
construction of the solar home system, a Village Development Committee (VDC) was 
set up. It comprised three male and two female members, all elected by local villagers. 
It worked with the Department of Fisheries to deal with local and financial affairs. 
Sardars’ authority was challenged by institutional exclusion – they were not invited to 
join the new institutional set-up.   
In 2004, the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) in Bangladesh 
approached the UNDP and the Department of Fisheries, and asked if they were 
interested in trying out communal solar home systems in one of their 37 communities. 
The officials of the LGED, during the interview, suggested that they needed a 
demonstration site to show that it was possible to provide an alternative energy supply 
to villages, which were not covered by the national grid-based electrification systems 
(interview, 21 August 2007). The Hindu community in Cox’s Bazar was selected 
because it was the poorest among the 37 communities, and the Hindu fishermen have 
long suffered from direct competition from their Muslim counterparts, as the latter are 
more organized and better-equipped.  
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A new Solar Operation Management Committee (SOMC) was formed and added within 
the new governance structure (Diagram 1). SOMC, comprised another five members 
(two male and three female), also elected by the public. If villagers faced any technical 
problems related to the solar home system, they were encouraged to meet the members 
of SOMC. If more serious issues, such as disputes over the payment arose, villagers 
should go to see VDC. If problems persisted, they could seek help from the government 
officials of LGED. Sardars were, once again, excluded from SOMC.  
Sardars felt that their dominant positions in the community had been undermined. 
Rather than making direct confrontation, Sardars exerted their influence in the new 
committees through their control of resources. Many committee members relied on 
Sardars for boat hiring and loans, so they felt the need to appease Sardars in return for 
stable livelihoods. As a result, they invited Sardars to play an ‘advisory’ role in the 
committees. A female committee member justified their action: ‘people respect them’.  
Apart from silencing opposition by bribing some committee members and threathening 
others ‘not to say anything’ (interview with government official, 23 August 2007), 
Sardars discredited the new governance structures in order to erode the villagers’ 
confidence. On one occasion, Sardars applied for 40,000 taka of micro-credit funding 
from the VDC for investment. The committee members believed that this would help 
create employment opportunities for the village, so they approved the application. To 
their surprise, Sardars refused to pay back on the due date. Other community members 
followed suit, and refused to repay their loans. A villager explained: ‘this creates a 



















(3 Male 2 Female)
Solar Operation Manage-
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need to pay’ (interview, 26 August 2007). Although some villagers made formal 
complaints to the LGED, and LGED officials subsequently intervened and tried to 
pressure  Sardars, their interventions proved ineffective, because of their limited 
political influence at the local level. As a result, the micro-credit system collapsed. In 
the short term, some poor community members might benefit from the collapse of the 
micro-credit system since they did not need to repay, but as a NGO worker suggested, 
in the long term, the poorest villagers ended up suffering the most because the micro-
credit system was intended to help them obtain cash and develop small business in order 
to escape the poverty trap (interview, 25 August 2007). 
The solar home project had some other unintended consequences in elite building. First, 
it allowed temple leaders to re-gain some influence in the community. According to the 
traditions of the fishing community, villagers paid a visit to the temple to receive 
blessings before they went fishing. A female Hindu temple leader suggested that the 
solar lighting system, which had enabled the temple to light the statues of gods inside 
the temple, had made worshippers more reverential to their gods because they could see 
their fearsome appearances. Second, both the LGED and the system operator gained 
tremendous influence over the process. The LGED devised the rules without consulting 
community members. According to the regulation, villagers could change the rules 
provided that they got the approval from the LGED. UNDP and LGED acknowledged 
the significance of capacity building in ensuring the sustainability of the solar energy 
project. They worked very hard to train a 20-year-old college student in the village to 
maintain the system. He received 1,500 Taka a month and was responsible for the daily 
functioning of the system. He became influential since he controlled the times of the 
electricity supply (although, officially LGED had fixed the time). During the interview, 
he admitted that some villagers attempted to bribe him in order to extend the opening 
hours of the electric supplies during wedding celebrations. Although local villagers 
could file complaints to LGED, they did not do so because this would upset inter-
personal relationships in the community.  
Despite the limitations, this project had some success. Fourteen out of 70 households 
were connected to solar lighting. The lighting enabled the households (most of which 
were not poor) to prolong their income generation activities, such as making fishing-
nets, in the evening, at home. As a result of lighting, women and girls felt safer walking 
in the village. 
4  Case study B: The ‘co-opt-elite’ approach in a regional trans-boundary water 
governance project in Ghana  
Ghana and Burkina Faso share 85 per cent of the Volta River Basin. How they manage 
water is crucial to the development of the region. The World Conservation Union 
(WCU) and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) funded and 
initiated the ‘Improving Water Governance in the Volta Basin’ Project (in French 
abbreviation PAGEV) in 2004. This 3-year project aimed to develop dialogue between 
Ghana and Burkina Faso over the trans-boundary use of water. It set up a regional rans-
boundary water governance committee in which regional ministers, bureaucrats, NGOs 
and local community members met and designed policies that helped adapt to climate 
change and ensure long-term ecological sustainability of the White Volta River Basin 
(PAGEV Annual Report 2007).    10
Public participation is normally not considered in many trans-boundary water 
governance set ups (Hirsch 2006; World Bank 2005). But this project chose eight local 
communities (four in north Ghana and four in south Burkina Faso), to participate in the 
regional trans-boundary water committee. These eight communities were selected based 
on four major factors: (1) adjacent to the White Volta River, (2) close relationships with 
the NGOs; (3) scale of the problems, and (4) diversity of the region, in terms of 
language and faith (interview with the Water Resource Commission officer, 20/8/09). 
Of the 24 total, eight female and sixteen male representatives were expected to represent 
the interests of their communities in planning discussions about the long-term use of the 
river.  
To decentralize the process, the project initiators adopted an open bid to select two local 
NGOs (one from north east Ghana and another from south Burkina Faso) to manage the 
ground work. To help local communities select their representatives, the NGOs 
requested that each community first choose three nominees. The NGOs set a number of 
criteria for the nomination: the nominees should come from three out of five categories: 
(1) chief or chief representative, (2) farmer group, (3) youth group, (4) Tindana 
(religious leaders) or assembly man (politician), and (5) women’s group. At least one 
out of the three local representatives must be female in order to promote gender equality 
(interview with Regional Ministry of Agriculture officer, 23/8/09). These arrangements 
were intended to ensure fair representation by choosing committee members from 
different socio-economic groups. Yet, some powerful people could easily exert their 
influence by getting their family members and relations elected in different categories. 
For instance, while the brother of a local chieftain in Sapeliga was elected, the wife of 
the chieftain in Kugrasia successfully secured a place in the committee.  
 
The NGOs stressed that public participation in the trans-boundary water project was 
crucial to tackling climate change because local villagers are the managers of local 
natural resources and they needed to develop a sense of ownership of the project in 
order to understand the inter-dependence of water resource management between 
communities and between countries.  
 
The NGOs identified the chieftains and Tindana responsible for causing poverty in the 
rural communities in north Ghana. Most of the land was owned by chieftains. The 
chieftains might act as ‘benevolent’ leaders by leasing less-fertile land to poor farmers 
during dry seasons. However, they actually preferred less-poor farmers because they 
owned cattle and they provided free ploughing service for the chieftains. Tindana 
contributed to rural poverty through the way villagers showed respect to the gods. Tinda 
performed religious ceremonies in return for which villagers donated crops and even 
animals. 
 
Instead of confronting the elites, the project coordinators and NGOs worked closely 
with local chieftains and Tindana. They considered them as ‘friends’, rather than 
‘suppressors’. They argued first, cooperation with the elites could maximize both the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the project. According to the participatory appraisal 
exercise, land was owned by the chiefs or Tindana. Their support would ensure a 
smooth process from, for example, confiscating land to creating the buffer zone to 
protect the river bank. Second, they were the traditional authority figures in their 
communities. Their involvement was seen as a sign of respect and approval. As a NGO 
worker explained: ‘no project will succeed without their support’ (interview, 28 August   11
2008). He also suggested that there was no point in choosing ordinary villagers as 
representatives because ‘no one will listen to them’. 
The regional water governance committee called for meetings twice a year. English and 
French were the official languages in the meetings, and interpretation was provided in 
order to enable local representatives to participate. The community representatives were 
expected to consult local opinions before the meetings, but some farmers told me that 
they rarely did so. The representatives were also expected to call for local meetings in 
order to explain what policies would be implemented. In my observations, local people 
rarely raised opposition. A few farmers did not participate in the meetings because their 
lands were located far away from the river, and they believed the project only targeted 
farmers along the river (interview, 29 August 2008).  
By the end of the project, a number of policies had been implemented in all eight 
communities. A 10-metre wide buffer zone was formed and trees were planted to 
stabilize the river bank. Although local chieftains and Tindana owned most of the lands 
in the communities, this scheme had not received much resistance from them. It is 
because free mango seedlings were offered to compensate for their loss. Organic 
farming was also introduced to improve soil fertility. In order to avoid poor people 
cutting down trees within the buffer zone, fuel-wood crops were cultivated at the edge 
of the buffer zone. Local representatives in Ghana and Burkina Faso participated in 
capacity building workshops three times a year.  
This policy, however, affected poor farmers disproportionately. Although most of them 
did not own land, particularly the relatively-fertile land along the river, the chieftains 
usually leased the small lands along the river to poor farmers during the dry seasons for 
two reasons: first, getting water from the river to irrigate farmlands during dry seasons 
was a hard work. Second, the chieftains wanted to be seen as ‘good’ leaders. The new 
buffer zone protection policy had made the chieftains reluctant to lease the land to poor 
farmers, and that had affected their livelihoods.  
The village representatives were generally considered by their communities to be 
problem-solvers. For example, engineers helped Sakom community to repair the leaking 
reservoir while pumping facilities were provided to Sapeliga and Mognori in dry 
seasons (PAGEV Annual Report, 2007). The reputation of the leaders had been 
improved because they brought tangible benefits, such as free trees, mango seedlings 
and pumping facilities, to their communities. In interviews, quite a lot of poor farmers 
expressed their willingness to hand over their farmlands to their leaders for the creation 
of the buffer zone. In their words, they believed that their chiefs ‘know the best’ and the 
creation of the buffer zone was good for long-term ecological sustainability. This 
project showed that the participation of the local elites in the water committee served to 
consolidate their authority in the communities.  
Despite the limitations, the project had a number of successes. It promoted an 
understanding of the inter-dependence of communities in dealing with climate change. 
It embraced social diversity in the institutional designs, for instance, Muslims, 
Christians and Pagans were involved in the project. Apart from English and French, 
interpretation of other languages, such as Bisia and Kussasi, were provided during 
meetings. Gender inclusion was also a key feature of the project. To ensure fair gender 
representation, each community was asked to select at least one woman as their 
representative (see Wong 2009b for more details).   12
5 Discussion   
The processes and the outcomes of the ‘counter-elite’ and ‘co-opt-elite’ approaches are 
summarized in Table 1. The nature of the elite domination in both case studies is 
slightly different. In the fishing community in Bangladesh, Sardars control most of the 
fishing equipment, such as boats and fishing nets. The resulting asset dependence 
contrasts with the Ghanaian case in which land is owned by chieftains and Tindana, 
resulting in land dependence. 
Table 1: Comparing the ‘counter-elite’ and the ‘co-opt-elite’ approaches  
 
  Solar home system project in Bangladesh  Trans-boundary water governance 
project in Ghana 

















Around the border between Ghana and 
Burkina Faso  
500 of each affected community 
Rural  
Community participation to improve trans-
boundary water decisions 
Approach  Counter-elite   Co-opt-elite 
Power perspective   - Power-over (resist elite domination to make 
changes)  
- Power-from-within (raise awareness and 
build capacity to empower the powerless) 
- Power-with (build partnership with elites 
to bring benefits to the poor)  
Strategies  - Sardars controlled most of the fishing 
equipment and assets 
- they were excluded from institutional 
building and committee participation 
- NGO empowered poor people to make 
decisions themselves  
- Chieftains and Tindana controlled all the 
land 
- they were invited to join the trans-
boundary water governance committee as 
local representatives 
- they negotiated the use of water with 
regional ministers, bureaucrats and NGOs  
Elites’ responses   - Sardars felt threatened by the exclusion 
- they infiltrated into the solar home 
management committee to influence agenda 
- they destabilized the micro-credit system to 
discredit the newly-created committee  
- Tindana were happy to let chieftains 
represent their interests in the water 
committee 
- Chieftains built networks with regional 
and local government officials  
Outcomes   - local people finally invited Sardars to work 
as ‘advisers’ in the committee 
- Hindu temple leaders re-gained influence in 
the village  
- Chieftains brought benefits, such as free 
mango seedlings, to their villages 
- ‘anti-poor’ policies, such as confiscating 
lands along the river bank, were 
implemented 
- pumping facilities reduced chieftains’ 
willingness to give lands to the poor for 




Both projects had conducted participatory appraisal exercises before the projects started. 
These exercises created the opportunity to explore local politics to identify elites and 
subsequently discuss with local people how elites could be ‘managed’. In both cases, 
the exercises were a missed opportunity. For instance, in the water project in Ghana, the 
focus of the participatory appraisal exercise was on climate change. Its aim was to find 
out the solutions to protecting the long-term ecological stability of the river with 
efficiency as the primary concern of the project. In the absence of a deep power 
analysis, the chieftains and Tindana were seen as the solution, rather than the problem; 
they were co-opted, rather than confronted.  
NGOs played an active role in both projects, but their domination in the decision-
making resulted in a top-down process of implementation. In both projects, local people 
were not involved in shaping the objectives and governance structures of the projects 
from the beginning. They were expected to carry out the tasks, rather than to lead.   13
Similar to the observations of Beard and Phakphian (2009), often this is ‘to rush the 
implementation of community-based approaches and …… not take the time to 
adequately empower poor’. This can, they warn, ‘create an environment ripe for capture 
by more powerful interests’ (p. 11). 
Both projects were shown to have a strong influence of institutional thinking, but the 
institutional solutions were very different in content and in practice. In Bangladesh, the 
rules of the game of local governance were completely re-drawn by the NGO. Sardars 
were excluded from participating in the solar home committees. Raising public 
awareness and organized capacities were also expected to foster community 
empowerment to further undermine their influence. On the contrary, the governance 
structures of the water project in Ghana were organized around the existing structures of 
authority by faciliting the chieftains and Tindana active roles in decision-making.  
5.1  Specific experiences in Bangladesh  
A few more specific lessons can be drawn from each project. The project organizers’ 
decision not to work with the local leaders in Bangladesh might appear to be the right 
thing to do because Sardars were identified as the cause of poverty. That said, a lack of 
detailed understanding of the complexity of people’s livelihoods (such as the 
dependence of poor people’s livelihoods on local elites) and a lack of public 
participation at the initial stages of the project (such as the choice of technological 
interventions and the approach to governance restructuring), have made this top-down 
project fail to challenge the power inequalities between the funders and local 
communities in the first place. The LGED explained that the project was largely 
‘technical and financial’ in nature at the initial stage, and community involvement 
would be premature. We also had an impression that both government officials and the 
NGO thought they were doing something good for the communities, and they knew how 
the goals could be achieved. Similar to the research findings of Cornwall and Coelho 
(2007), empowerment is a necessary condition to challenge elite capture, but skipping 
the empowerment phase by simply asking the powerless people to form committees and 
to elect leaders could prove ineffective. 
Without the political and financial support from outside, the experience in Bangladesh 
has also shown that institutional strengthening alone was not adequate to challenge local 
inequalities. It is clear from the case study that Sardars were capable of influencing the 
politics within the solar home committee, even without their physical presence. The 
elites’ strong manipulative skills have cast doubt over the assumption that the powerless 
can become transformative agents to challenge the elite domination even though the 
new institutional arrangements are intended to empower the poor. Since the livelihoods 
of the poor community members were heavily dependent on Sardars, the poor easily 
bow to the pressure from the privileged in return for stable livelihoods and community 
harmony. Their initiative to invite Sardars as ‘advisers’ in the solar home committee 
could be seen as the poor exercising their agency to reinforce the existing power 
inequalities. Furthermore, the revival of the influence of the Hindu temple leaders and 
the rising power of the government officials and the system operators were the 
unanticipated consequences of institutional crafting. This has demonstrated the 
difficulties of getting the institutions right.    14
5.2  Specific experiences in Ghana  
The project organizers in Ghana were convinced of the need to co-opt local elites for the 
sake of project efficiency. My research has, however, demonstrated that it is difficult to 
control the elites once they are absorbed in the system. This political reality has raised 
uncertainty about the claim by Platteau and Abraham (2002) that ‘benevolent elites’ 
would channel some benefits to the poor.  
The co-option strategies have the potential to have significant implications on poverty. 
Elites are power-sensitive, but by definition, they are financially better off than the poor. 
Therefore, they are less poverty-sensitive and less concerned about how policies 
implemented on the ground will affect the local poor. In the Ghana case study, the 
chieftains appear to have helped to make the right decisions to restore the long-term 
ecological stability of the river in response to the threats of climate change. In achieving 
this, however, the short-term livelihoods of the poor may have been compromised. The 
creation of the buffer zone along the river banks, for example, aimed to reduce soil 
erosion and strengthen flood protection. Farmers were asked to stop cultivation within 
the buffer zone. This policy hit poor farmers disproportionately because lands along the 
river bank were usually fertile, and the availability of river water made irrigation easy. 
The confiscation of the farmlands, for the sake of creating the buffer zone, had, 
therefore, become a blow to the livelihoods of very poor farmers. Furthermore, as a 
result of the water project, the availability of pumping facilities has changed the 
chieftains altruistic acts. Traditionally, the chieftains were willing to lease the less-
fertile lands to poor farmers during the dry season because at that time productivity was 
low. But, pumping has revolutionarized farming practices in the communities because 
irrigation enables farmlands to be located away from the river. As a result, the chieftains 
and Tindana are less willing to lease their land to the needy families. 
The water project has also demonstrated the complexity of power in two aspects: 
benefit-sharing between chieftains and Tindana and dissatisfaction from local people. 
This study has stressed that chieftains and Tindana controlled half of the land in some 
communities in north Ghana, but Tindana have not been represented in the water 
committee. This lack of representation has not caused any conflicts between them. In 
one case, the Tindana was the brother of the chieftain. In others, the chieftains would 
ensure that the benefits, such as free mango seedlings, would be shared with Tindana. 
Concerning the relationships between elites and local people, my interviews suggested 
that not all farmers were content with the performance of the chieftains in the project. 
They complained that the elites rarely had consultations before the water meetings 
started. One male villager believed that ‘they go to Bolga [a city] to meet the important 
people’ (interview, 28 August 2008), and then kept all the political gains, rather than to 
share with them. Despite the grievance, they rarely confronted their chieftains because, 
as one villager put it, he did not want to be seen as a trouble maker. The strong norms of 
conflict avoidance in the communities have silenced the opposition, and therefore 
worked favourably with political co-option. 
6  Conclusions and policy implications  
This paper has demonstrated the paradoxes of including and excluding local elites in the 
community-based development. The dilemmas are that challenging the authority of 
local elites, by excluding them from the governance structures, does not necessarily 
undermine their influence, whereas co-opting with them in the new institutional   15
arrangements risks reinforcing power inequalities and worsening poverty. The 
subjective feeling of the poor in both case studies has helped perpetuate the elite capture 
problems. One of the constraints of the ‘counter-elite’ approach shown in Bangladesh is 
the asset dependence of the poor on Sardars. Risk aversion, feeling insecure about their 
own livelihoods and the sense of powerlessness have all constrained them from 
confronting the elites. In contrast, the ‘co-opt-elite’ approach in Ghana has further 
legitimized the rules of the chieftains and Tindana. The poor tended to feel inferior, and 
they did not feel it appropriate to challenge the elites in the community meetings.  
However, this paper does not suggest that shifting community-based projects from elite-
driven to community-focused is doomed to failure. First, the ‘counter-elite’ and ‘co-opt-
elite’ approaches should not be seen as ‘either-or’. Elites can be absorbed and 
challenged in the same project at the same time. More time should be given to 
observations and to conduct proper participatory appraisal exercises in order to have a 
deeper understanding of the underlying power structures in the communities. Our 
research on solar lighting in India indicates that there are some ‘benevolent elites’ who 
have accumulated certain levels of wealth and social status genuinely want to serve their 
communities simply since they feel good to do so (Wong 2010).  
Second, reducing the land and other asset dependence by seeking alternative livelihoods 
with the poor offers a necessary condition to break the patron-client relationships. Third, 
the process of challenging elite domination can only be sustained if the poor are 
genuinely empowered and they feel that this can make a difference to their lives, as 
suggested by Cleaver and Harmada (2010). Fourth, NGOs and other development 
agencies should maintain their high power-sensitivity at the post-implementation stage 
of the projects. They should continuously provide support to local people in order to 
monitor the influence of the elites over the development processes.    16
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